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STATEMENT 0F THE CASE

I.

A. Nature 0f the case.

Sean Zarinegar (“Zarinegar”) appeals from the District Court’s
Order entered on July

1,

2019

(the

Memorandum Decision and

“SJ Order”) and the Judgment and Permanent Injunction

Against Defendants Sean Zarinegar and Performance Realty Management,

September 30, 2019

(the “Final Judgment”).

Performance Realty Management,

Uniform

LLC (“PRM”)

Securities Act, in four different

Zarinegar and

PRM

The SJ Order ruled
committed

LLC

issued 0n

that Defendants Zarinegar

and

securities fraud, Violating the Idaho

and independent ways. The Final Judgment then ordered

to fully reimburse the

$550,800 in investment funds fraudulently obtained,

plus pay a $20,000 civil penalty (and permanently enj oined

them from

issuing, offering, or selling

securities in Idaho).

The case involves

the fraudulent sale of securities

by two

inter-related

companies formed

and run by Zarinegar. Zarinegar advertised both companies as exclusively in the business ofbuying
undervalued residential real estate and holding

it,

proﬁting from rents, paying out an annual

8%

return plus net proﬁts to investors, and ultimately qualifying as a speciﬁc investment vehicle: a
real-estate investment trust (“REIT”). Zarinegar’s partners cold-called a

James Rees (“Rees”) and convinced him

t0 invest

Idaho resident

$550,800 in these real-estate investment

companies during a two year period from 2014-2016. Rees never received the promised annual
return or any return at

all.

Instead, Zarinegar

Zarinegar’s personal accounts, for his

companies transfer

all

own

moved

large

amounts 0f Rees’s investment

into

personal spending, and then Zarinegar had his two

remaining assets t0 a cannabis business in 2017 (Without Rees’s knowledge

0r consent), which business quickly

became

worthless.

The Department then ﬁled

this action,

seeking t0 recover a judgment against Zarinegar (and any existing company) for securities fraud.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT — Page
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The Department prevailed at summary judgment based on the undisputed facts that showed several
fraudulent omissions 0f material facts and misuse of investment proceeds.

B. Course of the proceedings.

On July 20, 2018,
ﬁled
as

its

the Idaho Department 0f Finance, Securities

Complaint against Zarinegar and

“Nominal Defendants”).

(R., pp.

committed securities fraud, as
at

Idaho Code § 30-14-501(2)
o

PRM (and four other entities

14-32.)

statutorily

Bureau

The Complaint alleged

deﬁned in the Idaho Uniform

(the

“Department”)

and one individual,

listed

and

PRM

that Zarinegar

Securities

Act (the “IUSA”)

& (4) (“General Fraud”), by:

failing to disclose that Zarinegar

had been previously sanctioned by three

states

related to the sale 0f securities;

he would transfer investor funds into his personal accounts;

0

failing t0 disclose

o

failing to disclose that

he could and/or would transform his real estate investing

companies into a cannabis company; and
0

diverting investor funds into his personal use Without disclosing that use prior
to receiving the investor funds.

(R., pp. 29-30.)

The Complaint

stated that the

“JR” (Rees), an Idaho resident and

Department sought

to recover

damages caused

to

investor.

On February 22, 20 1 9, the Department ﬁled its initial motion for partial summary judgment
against Zarinegar and

PRM and the supporting Memorandum, Statement 0f Undisputed Facts, and

Afﬁdavits from Stephanie Sze and Nancy AX, Which attached Exhibits
703.)

On March 20th,

motion for

partial

Zarinegar and

PRM (through counsel, Brian Webb Legal) ﬁled their cross-

1-3. (R., pp.

opposition to the Department’s

AX

113-

summary judgment and supporting Memorandum and Declaration 0f Counsel,

Which attached Exhibits

the Sze and

A through EE. (R., pp.

710-960.)

On

April 3rd, Zarinegar and

summary judgment motion and their motions

PRM

ﬁled their

t0 strike portions

Afﬁdavits. (R., pp. 961-992.). Also 0n April 3rd, the Department ﬁled

opposition t0 Zarinegar and

PRM’s summary judgment motion, plus
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT — Page
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a second

0f
its

AX afﬁdavit, which

FF-GGG.

attached Exhibits

second

strike the

1370-1423.)

(R., pp.

978-1366.)

On May 7th, Zarinegar and PRM ﬁled a motion to

AX afﬁdavit and a Declaration from Zarinegar, which attached Exhibit

On May

9th, the

Department ﬁled

its

motion

1.

(R., pp.

of the Zarinegar

to strike parts

Declaration. (R., pp. 1427-35.)

On 0r about May

13,

2019, Zarinegar ﬁled his ﬁrst ﬁlings under his

the signature 0f counsel. (R., pp. 1442-1521.)

own name and without

The eighty pages of ﬁlings contained

ﬁngerprints,

references to “copy right/copy claim,” an “Afﬁdavit 0f Silver Surety” and countless other

absurdities, while not raising

Webb

any

intelligible legal issue. (Id)

A

day

later,

on

14th, Brian

Legal ﬁled a motion t0 Withdraw, with a supporting declaration from counsel that cited a

“signiﬁcant breakdown 0f the attorney-client relationship” and Zarinegar and

0f the attorney—client relationship.
reply brief in support 0f

second

strike the

motion

t0

HHH-K4.

Withdraw 0f Brian

and the related motions

On May 21,
Alan Conilogue

The

its

Also on

May

14th, the

himself,

termination

Department ﬁled

its

PRM’S motion

to

and additional afﬁdavits from AX, Toni Brown, and counsel, Which

(R., pp.

Webb

to strike

1587-1896). Also, the Department ﬁled

Legal, noting that both cross—motions for

were

fully briefed

and ready for hearing.

Webb

Department appeared for a hearing regarding

Court indicated that

it

was

had discussions With Zarinegar

would have no counsel

to represent

its

summary judgment

(R., pp.

of Brian

all

objection to the

1897-1903.)

Webb

(Tr. 7:10-17.)

that revealed Zarinegar

PRM, and would

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT — Page

Legal, and

outstanding motions. (Tr.

initially inclined t0 grant counsel’s

withdraw and thereby delay the hearing on the dispositive motions.
District Court

PRM’s

opposition t0 Zarinegar and

2019, Zarinegar, Joshua Leonard and Brian

for the

District

(R., pp. 1522-33.)

summary judgment,

AX afﬁdavit,

attached Exhibits

5:3-5.)

May

motion

t0

However, the

was intending

t0 represent

be representing himself in an

3

illogical

and disruptive manner,1

Which would

t0 mirror his recent ﬁlings,

the case and prejudice to the Department. (Tr. 5: 1 5-6: 19, 7: 1 8-33 :4.)

there

was n0 good cause

Brian

t0 allow

Webb

Webb made

detailed arguments

0f

The District Court determined

Legal t0 Withdraw prior t0 oral arguments on the

motions and oppositions they had ﬁled and fully briefed.

and Attorney

result in obstruction

(Tr.

33 25-3427.) The hearing went forward

0n behalf of Zarinegar and PRM.

(Tr. 35:4-38: 19,

42:14-43:14, 5425-6929.) Zarinegar was prohibited from speaking further. (Tr. 34:24-25.) At the

end 0f the hearing, the

made

District

Court took

all

motions under advisement and concluded,

the right decision going forward because, Mr.

Webb,

could have ever been able to present the case With the

one good decision today.”

On 0r about June
his

1

own name and

The following

is

I

“I think

I

can’t imagine that Mr. Zarinegar

skill that

you

did.

And

so

I

made

at least

(Tr. 69:20-24.)

14 and 27, 2019, Zarinegar submitted dozens more pages of ﬁlings under

Without his attorneys’ signatures, Which ﬁlings again raised no decipherable

an example of Zarinegar’s refusal to communicate normally during the hearing:

The Court: Are you not one of the defendants?
The Defendant: I again am — you know my proper name
colon Zarinegar.

I

is full

colon Sean,

full

—

The Court: There you go with this full colon stuff again. What’s a full colon?
The Defendant: I’m not a trustee or a debtor. I am a beneﬁciary too. It looks like
you’ve got Sean Zarinegar here and that’s again — just for the record, I withdraw
name for public use at all here. I don’t authorize it.
The Court: What d0 you mean you don’t authorize it?
The Defendant: I don’t authorize the use. Ihave a private copyright copy claim t0
that name and I don’t — I withdraw any use 0f that name for public use.
The Court: What’s this C S S C P G? What’s that?
The Defendant: Correct Sets and Structure Perse Syntax Grammar. That just my
the use of that

.

..

identiﬁcation, judge.

The Court: You’ve

got an

American ﬂag and then

That’s the

ﬂag. That’s one in three

—

says: “Flag

mean?
if
Miller
ﬂag,
Wynn
you will.

contract postal vessel court venue.”

The Defendant:

What does

it

of this document

that

the dimensions are that 0f the

It’s

not the American

Wynn Miller ﬂag.

(Tr. 12:19-1428.)
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legal issues. (R., pp. 191 1-1977.)

On July

1,

2019, the District Court issued

its

SJ Order. (R., pp.

1982-2017.) The SJ Order addressed the motions to strike brought by Zarinegar and

PRM

and

granted them in part and denied them in part. (R., pp. 1993-2005 .) Based 0n the remaining evidence
in the record, the District

Court granted summary judgment to the Department, ﬁnding that the

undisputed material facts supported a ﬁnding of four separate and independent instances of
securities fraud (pursuant t0 the

0

IUSA)

related to the $550,800 invested

“the Cease and Desist Orders [from Kansas and

disclosed and their omission from
0

ARP

and

by Rees:

Alabama] were not

PRM’s PPMs was

material”;

“the omission 0r misrepresentation regarding the transfer 0f

PRM’S

property to Zarinegar’s personal bank accounts was material”;
o

“a reasonable investor would not have concluded or been put on notice that

be transferred from real estate to cannabis. The
omission 0f this fact was material”; and

their investment could

o

“Zarinegar

money

personal use without
Rees’s
investment money.”
speciﬁcally disclosing that use before receiving
diverted

investor

for

his

2006-14.) The SJ Order also granted the motion t0 Withdraw for Brian

(R., pp.

explaining

Why the motion was not immediately granted
After

all

the above Motions and material

at the

Webb

Legal,

May 21“ hearing:

was ﬁled (and a mere seven days

before the hearing), Defendants’ counsel ﬁled a Motion t0 Withdraw. Given the

voluminous ﬁlings
it

would

that

were already before the Court, and the prejudice and delay
all of the above Motions before considering
Withdraw. The Motion to Withdraw was ultimately taken

cause, the Court considered

Defendants’ Motion t0

under advisement along with

On or about July

19th and

all

the other Motions. (R., p. 2014.)

22nd and August

5th,

2019, the

now pro se Zarinegar submitted

another twenty pages of nonsensical ﬁlings that raised n0 cognizable legal issues. (R., pp. 202841, 2050-62.)

(R., pp.

The Department then voluntarily dismissed

its

claims against

all

the nominal parties

2063-74) and 0n September 18th, the Department ﬁled a Motion for Entry of Judgment,

seeking a ﬁnal judgment based on the fraud ﬁndings in the SJ Order and With

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT — Page
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all

other claims and

parties dismissed. (R., pp.

thirty

pages ofpro

se,

2086-9 1 .)

On 0r about September 23, 2019, Zarinegar submitted another

nonsensical writings. (R., pp. 2094-2123.)

On September 30th, the District Court held its ﬁnal hearing. Zarinegar appeared and argued
in support ofhis

105: 13 .)

manypro se ﬁlings

73 12-78z21) and to oppose entry ofjudgment. (Tr. 90:25:

Many 0f his arguments continued to be nonsensical and/or non-sequitur.

Court orally denied
for entry

(Tr.

all

ofjudgment

“motions” brought by Zarinegar

15,

On

make nonsensical

in

in civil penalties. (R., pp. 2124-28.)

2019, Zarinegar ﬁled his Notice of Appeal. (R., pp. 2152-54.)

not appeal. Zarinegar continued t0
76, 2188-93.)

and entered a money judgment for $550,800

Department for Rees) and $20,000

October

and granted the motion

PRM that imposed a permanent ban from “issuing,

offering, 0r selling securities in the State 0f Idaho”

On

The District

for the Department. (Tr. 105:18-106:1 1.) Later that day, the District Court

entered Final Judgment against Zarinegar and

restitution (to the

(Tr. 78:22-86: 10)

(Id)

PRM

did

ﬁlings with the District Court. (R., pp. 2 1 65-

October 16th, the District Court issued an Order Striking Defendant Sean

Zarinegar’s “Notice of Motion

Amicus Curiae Show Cause”

Filing, stating:

The case caption 0n the ﬁling speciﬁes that the “Petitioner” is “Common Law
Grand Jury on behalf of Petitioner Sean Zarinegar,” and the “Respondent(s)” are
“Judge Samuel Hoagland, Brian Nicholas.” The ﬁling is signed illegibly by “Grand
Jury Foreman.” From what the Court can garner 0f this nonsensical ﬁling, Zarinegar
is attempting t0 obtain an “Order to Show Cause” against this Court and attorney
Brian Nicholas, regarding “fraudulent court procedures” based 0n this Court’s
supposed lack 0f personal jurisdiction.
Zarinegar’s ﬁling lacks any basis under the Constitution, laws of the State of
Idaho, and the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure.

be a legal nullity.

It

should be noted that Zarinegar does not have authority t0

a criminal case and that this ﬁling
(R., pp.

A review of the ﬁling reveals

is

made

in a civil case that has

it

to

initiate

been concluded.

2155-56.)

C. Statement 0f facts.

The
Which

District Court’s SJ

are restated here With a

Order

details the material,

few additions and

undisputed facts (R., pp. 1982-89),

citations t0 the record.
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1.

The Cease and Desist Orders

On
(“Kansas

July

Alabama and Kansas

against Zarinegar.

2007, the Securities Commission of Kansas issued a Cease and Desist Order

6,

C&D”)

in

against

numerous Respondents, including Zarinegar.

(R., pp.

1630-1663.) The

thirty-two page order contained 117 paragraphs of ﬁndings related t0 an investigation and audit of

the

books of Malory Investments

LLC

Pennsylvania. These ﬁndings detailed

placement memoranda (“PPM”),
documentation 0f

its

securities

private placement offerings

(“Malory”) by

state regulators

from California, Kansas, and

how Malory was the broker—dealer of record for

how Malory performed n0 due

work, and

(“PPO”) and

how Malory was

securities

bad

diligence or other required

connected t0 numerous fraudulent

actors.

The Kansas

Zarinegar was an employee of Malory for four years from 2001-05. In

Kansas

107 private

its

C&D

indicated that

Conclusions 0f Law, the

C&D identiﬁed dozens of securities Violations and named Zarinegar speciﬁcally in four of

them. (R., pp. 1656-57.)

At approximately
issued

its

own Cease and

allegations as the

CRD

Kansas

the

same

time,

on July

Desist Order (the

5,

2007, the Alabama Securities Commission

“Alabama C&D”)

that contained

many 0f the same

C&D but contained additional details regarding Zarinegar:

disciplinary disclosure records for Zarinegar reﬂect a personal, Chapter 7

Bankruptcy Case #SAOO- 1 3205L discharged 0n July 3 1 2000 involving a high-risk
,

private investment in restaurants that resulted in maj or losses in personal income.

had a felony charge for cultivation 0f Marijuana in
Case # 93HF0356, that was dismissed 0n November 5,
1993. He was also named in two NASD Arbitration Cases. The ﬁrst is NASD case
# 9901479, alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation, breach 0f ﬁduciary duty
and negligence in connection With investments in two limited liability company
private placements in November 1997, in the amount 0f $105,000. The second is
NASD case # 99-03941, involving suitability 0f investments and breach of
ﬁduciary duty in connection with investments in two limited partnerships during
the period 0f 1995 t0 1997, in the amount 0f $369,500. Additionally, Zarinegar was
named as a respondent in a civil law suit ﬁled in Superior Court 0f California (Case
Number 808225) in 1999. The complaint involved investments in two limited
partnerships in 1995 and 1996 and was settled in January 2000 for $22,000.
In April of 1993 Zarinegar

Orange County,

California,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT — Page
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1677-1708, 1680.) The Alabama

(R., pp.

C&D

also provided this

summary

statement regarding

the investigation:

Respondents engaged in a wide range of fraudulent securities offerings in which
they conspired to sell over one hundred offerings raising hundreds of millions of
dollars through the use of the Reg. D 506 exemption. Among other acts,
Respondents employed unregistered sales agents, paid undisclosed sales
commissions, fraudulently overstated potential returns on investments, failed to
disclose criminal backgrounds 0f principals, and failed to accurately disclose use

ofproceeds, assets 0f the issuers and other material information. In

MALORY

fact,

an average 0f one per week, despite MALORY
operating from a residential apartment, not advertising, and not even maintaining a
Yellow Pages listing.
conducted private offerings

at

In order to facilitate their conduct,

RESPONDENTS

formed

shell

companies,

names of individuals Without their knowledge, and
involvement 0f key individuals. They engaged in this conduct

acted under false names, used
failed to disclose the

through a broker—dealer that failed t0 maintain books and records, ignored

its

obligations t0 perform due diligence, and repeatedly ﬁled regulatory ﬁlings

containing false statements.
(R., pp. 1682-83).

After listing dozens ofviolations

ordered that

“RESPONDENTS

from further

offers

“Kansas

him

year

securities laws, the

and sales of any security into, within, or from the Alabama.”

later,

0n July

Alabama C&D

[deﬁned t0 include Zarinegar] immediately CEASE AND DESIST

record contains n0 document suggesting the

A

ofAlabama

Alabama

(R., p. 1709.)

The

C&D was ever Withdrawn 0r changed.

14, 2008, Zarinegar signed a Stipulation

For Consent Order (the

C&D Stip.”) that “waive[d] his right to any hearing” and resolved the allegations against

in Kansas. (R., pp. 1666-70.)

The Kansas

C&D

Stip. “incorporated

by reference”

separate paragraphs” 0f ﬁndings of fact and conclusions 0f law from the Kansas

the “122

C&D and added

“an additional ﬁnding of fact” that “while [Zarinegar] willingly and wrongfully allowed his name
t0

be

listed

on Respondent Malory’s Form

BD

[Broker-Dealer] showing he

Respondent Malory, he performed n0 duties for Respondent Malory.”

C&D

Stip. stated that a

was a

‘principal’

(R., p. 1666.)

of

The Kansas

Consent Order would be issued “without further proceedings” and “shall

constitute neither an admission nor a denial that the allegations serving as a basis for the
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Consent

Order are

true.” (R., p. 1667.)

On

July 21, 2008, the Kansas Securities Commissioner issued the

Consent Order (the “Kansas C.O.”) regarding Zarinegar

that “adopt[ed] the Findings

Conclusions 0f Law” that had been incorporated from the Kansas

of Fact and

C&D into the Kansas C&D Stip.

(R1 672-76.) The Kansas C.O. required that Zarinegar cease and desist from any involvement with
securities in

Kansas unless those

registered 0r exempt, and Zarinegar

2.

securities

were registered or exempt,

was not

any Kansas

Violating

The

ARP PPM and sales t0 an Idaho investor.

On

October 21, 2009,

PRM was

Zarinegar was listed as the manager of
the capital 0r proﬁts. (R., p. 182.)

Partners,

LLC (“ARP”)

vested in

its

Manager:

On December
Securities”

by

ARP

On

company, and

liability

PRM and sole member owning 20% or greater interest in

September

3,

2013, Zarinegar organized American Realty

company and

stated that

management was

(R., p. 186.)

Form

20, 2013, Zarinegar ﬁled a

with the SEC.

(R., pp. 190-93.)

Zar”2 was the “Executive Ofﬁcer” 0f ARP,
Estate,”

salespersons were

securities laws. (R., p. 1674.)

organized as an Arizona limited

as an Arizona limited liability

PRM.

all

and ARP was attempting

D

The Form

“Notice 0f Exempt Offering of

D

disclosure indicated that “Sean

ARP was in the “Industry Group” of “Residential Real

t0 raise $ 1 0,000,000

through the sale of equity securities exempt

from registration under Reg. D, Rule 506(b). (Id) Zar estimated

that

ARP would not pay any sales

commissions or ﬁnders’ fees and none of the proceeds raised would be used

pay executive

t0

ofﬁcers, directors or promoters, such as himself. (Id)

Zar advertised and sold ARP securities by way of a PPM.

(R., pp. 196-267.)

The ARP

stated, in relevant part:

The Company was formed on September

3,

2013

t0

(i)

acquire, ﬁnance,

reﬁnance, maintain, improve, develop, construct lease, manage,

sell,

own,

exchange, 0r

otherwise dispose of residential and/or commercial real property located in the
2

It is

not disputed that Sean Zar

is

Zarinegar, though

it is

not clear
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why he used the

alias.

PPM

western United States

...,

and

(ii)

engage in such other

activities as are

reasonably

incidental t0 the foregoing.

per

Members Who invest in this Offering Will earn a preferred return equal t0 8%
annum on the amount 0f their capital contribution.
The Company intends to sell 1,000 limited liability company units
at price

of $10,000 per Unit.

PPM is replete with statements

(R., p. 197.)

The

properties at

10w prices and repairing and renting them

Will be related t0 real estate,

and therefore, are subj ect

the real estate market.” (R., pp. 197-237, 2 14.)

be used almost exclusively (97%) for real

Manager
[REIT]

1,

at

about

The

how ARP’s
out, e.g.

future time ...” (R., p. 207.)

is

buying residential

“Each of the Investments 0f ARP

to the ﬂuctuations in value associated

with

PPM details how new investor proceeds would

estate. (R., pp.

203-04.) The

intends to investigate the possibility of converting

some

business

ARP t0

PPM

also states,

“The

a real estate investment trust

The attached Balance Sheet

for

ARP as ofNovember

2013, shows $4.792 million in real estate assets (90% of all assets) and only $1.055 million in

liabilities. (R., p.

239.)

The

PPM

is

ﬁlled With the typical boilerplate regarding risks of loss and

broad authority of the manager t0 run ARP; however, nothing in the
in the future liquidate its real property assets

completely different business,

The

e.g.

and instead use

PPM suggests that ARP may

assets

its

and investor funds for a

a cannabis business. (R., pp. 195-267.)

PPM states that PRM is the manager of ARP, with “exclusive authority t0 manage the

business and affairs of the

Company Without member approval”;

it

further states,

“The success 0f

ARP Will depend, to a large extent, upon the quality of the management provided by the Manager
[PRM] and

its

key personnel

Manager,” the PPM

lists

....” (R.,

pp. 202, 21

Sean Zar as the

1.)

Under

the section titled

CEO and founder ofPRM. (R., p. 208.) The PPM provides

two paragraphs of details lauding Sean Zar’s experience both With
companies; however,

from just

it

“Key Personnel 0f

real estate

and With investment

does not disclose the Cease and Desist Orders from Kansas and Alabama

six years prior regarding Zarinegar

and his employment With Malory (an
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entity accused

of helping to

sell

selling through

numerous fraudulent and unregistered PPOS, similar t0 What Zarinegar was now

ARP).

In April or

(Id.)

May

2014, Jack Combs, the managing partner of

Boise, Idaho, a retired

made

(R., pp.

four separate investments in

ARP,

PRM,

cold-called Rees 0f

155-156, 208.) During the next twelve months, Rees

on 0r about

totaling $300,000. First,

signed a Subscription Agreement t0 buy “5 limited liability

May 4,

2014, Rees

company units” 0f ARP and signed a

personal check for $50,000 t0 “American Realty Partners.” (R., pp. 1036-1056). Second, 0n 0r

about June 25, 2014, Rees signed a Subscription Agreement to buy “10 limited

liability

company

units” 0f ARP, and signed a personal check for $100,000 t0 “Performance Realty.” (R., pp. 1057-

1087.) Third, 0n or about

limited liability

company

December
units” 0f

24, 2014,

ARP

Realty Partners.” (R., pp. 1088-1109.)
Subscription Agreement t0

buy “10

Rees signed a Subscription Agreement

and signed a personal check for $50,000

And

on 0r about

fourth,

limited liability

(“AHIT”)

(R., pp.

ARP PPM prior to each purchase of securities.

In early 2015,

after a

0f ARP, and continued with

AHIT

D

1019-1087.)

It

(R., pp.

756-

appears nothing

continued in the “business 0f acquiring and

its

business out of the business ofﬁces

PRM as the manager of the subsidiary ARP.

(R., pp. 735, 757, 770.)

PRM PPM and sales to an Idaho investor.

Zarinegar did not raise funds solely through

Form

(R., pp.

ARP were apparently converted into shares of AHIT.

operating residential properties,” operated as a REIT, ran

a

a personal

1019-1 139.) Rees acknowledged

Plan of Conversion and Stock Exchange Agreement was completed.

remarkable changed regarding the business:

The

Rees signed a

ARP became a Wholly owned subsidiary ofAmerican Housing Income Trust

57, 785.) Rees’s shares in

3.

19, 2015,

buy “5

“American

company units” of ARP and signed

check for $100,000 to “American Realty Partners.”
review of the

May

t0

t0

ARP. On December

11,

2015, Zarinegar ﬁled

“Notice 0f Exempt Offering of Securities” 0n behalf 0f PRM (manager of ARP). (R.,
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pp. 270-74.)

and was

The Notice

selling

up

Reg. D., Rule 505.

indicated that

to $1,500,000

(1d,)

PRM was in the “Industry Group”

of “Other Real Estate”

of equity securities that were exempt from registration under

Zarinegar again estimated that

or ﬁnders’ fees and no proceeds raised

PRM would not pay any sales commissions

would be used

t0

pay executive ofﬁcers,

directors 0r

promoters, such as himself. (Id)

Zarinegar advertised and sold

PRM

securities also

by way 0f a PPM, which he admits he

personally caused t0 be created and then reviewed and approved: “In

PRM,

I

directed the creation of the

PPM

my capacity

Prior t0 dissemination of the

as

Manager of

PRM PPM

I

thoroughly reviewed the entire document With legal counsel.” (R., pp. 275-317, 1377-79.) The

PRM PPM

addressed

PRM’S

real-estate investments

inter—relatedness With

ARP

and

AHIT and

its

management of the

of ARP and AHIT:

The Company is a manager-managed limited liability company organized in the
Sean Zarinegar is identiﬁed as the Manager in the Articles 0f
State of Arizona
The Company is the Manager of American
Organization and the sole member.
Realty, a Wholly owned subsidiary 0f AHIT, a publicly reporting company. .. The
Company’s sole asset is 1,000,000 shares 0f common stock in AHIT, which were
earned pursuant to the terms of the American Realty First Amended Operating
.

Agreement.

The Company

is

devoted to real estate management, acquisition and investor

related-entities such as

American Realty, AHIT and their respective

relations for

its

subsidiaries

and future management opportunities captured through capital raised

through this Offering.

Use 0f Proceeds
It is the Company’s

intention to use proceeds raised through the Offering

towards the general operations 0f the

Company in serving as Manager 0f American

Realty.

Our sole tangible asset is restricted AHIT common stock.
Our ﬁnancial performance is directly tied into the performance of AHIT. The

Company has no other tangible assets other than the $ 1 ,000,000 shares 0f restricted
common stock in AHIT. The Company has no other tangible assets other than the
1,000,000 shares of restricted common stock in AHIT. Although Mr. Zarinegar sits
on the Board ofDirectors

for

AHIT, and serves

as the corporation’s
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Chief Financial

Ofﬁcer and Treasurer, and is the beneﬁcial owner of a majority interest in AHIT,
he does not have exclusive control over, amongst other things, the declaration of
any dividends related to the shares of AHIT since such determinations are to be
made by the Board 0f Directors, Which currently consists 0f three directors.
(R., p. 278.)

Again, the

t0 suggest that

off

its

PRM PPM contained the typical boilerplate about risk of loss but nothing

PRM could or would soon completely transform its business,

real estate investment business

business. (R., pp. 275-317.)

Desist Orders from

The

PPM

and transfer

all

assets

and investor proceeds

Form

D

on or about December

transfer 0f $172,283,

Questionaire for

PRM.

(R., pp.

1,

2015, Rees

285-318, 1141-45.)

On

made

“Performance Realty” in the amount 0f $18,517.03.
his ﬁnal investment to

buy 4

6,

2016,

PRM

ﬁled the required

securities sales in Idaho. (R., pp.

another investment in

PRM, and

PRM,

executing

signing a personal check t0

(R., pp. 1147-50.) Third,

0n February 26,

units of PRM, executing an Investor Questionaire

and signing a personal check t0 “Performance Realty”

“40K

PRM

0f Process, wherein he consented to

any proceeding arising out 0f the

a Subscription Agreement and Investor Questionaire for

made

three investments in

made his ﬁrst investment in PRM,

January

t0 Service

320-28.) Second, on or about January 26, 2016, Rees

2016, Rees

to a cannabis

of PRM securities in Idaho to Rees, and Zarinegar

Form U-2 Uniform Consent

service 0f process in Idaho for

sell

and executing a Subscription Agreement and Investor

in Idaho that disclosed this ﬁrst sale

signed the required

AHIT

that ordered sanctions against Zarinegar in 2007. (Id.)

From December 2015 through February 2016, Rees made

making a Wire

help

from Zarinegar also made no disclosure 0f the Cease and

Alabama and Kansas

totaling $250,800.03. First,

e.g.,

in the

amount of $60,000, With the notation:

Shares AHIT.” (R., pp. 1151-55.)
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4.

AHIT’s

On

disclosure 0f Zarinegar’s history 0f Cease and Desist Orders.

January 19, 2016,

Which was signed by

its

AHIT

ﬁled a

Form

S-l l/A Registration Statement with the

three directors, including Zarinegar as

SEC,

“Chairman 0f the Board, Chief

Financial Ofﬁcer and Treasurer.” (R., pp. 819, 933.) In that ﬁling, on page 28 of 141,

AHIT

stated,

Legal Matters
Mr. Zarinegar is subject t0 consent cease and desist orders issued by the Kansas
Securities Commission and Alabama Securities Commission. These orders are not
related to the Company. ... Zarinegar has two disclosure events set forth in his CRD,
both 0f Which revolve around alleged activity during his tenure at Malory. These
disclosures are not customer complaints; rather, they revolve around cease and desist
orders issued by the State of Kansas and the State of Alabama in 2007 as part of
their respective investigations into Malory and six other primary respondents. The
allegations against Zarinegar were that he failed t0 properly supervise the sale of
private offerings in Kansas and Alabama. Zarinegar has ﬁled a Statement 0f Claim
for Expungement with FINRA pursuant to Rule 2080. Mr. Zarinegar has been in
compliance With the Orders since issuance. The Orders are not related in any manner
with respect to the Company or its related parties. T0 [sic] Orders do not restrict Mr.
Zarinegar from engaging in an offering in the State of Kansas 0r State of Alabama
provided he complies With the appropriate disclosures and laws. The Company is
not aware of any similar orders in any other jurisdiction.
(R., p. 846;

see also R., p. 800, similar disclosure 0n page 49 of 66 in subsequent lO-K ﬁled 0n

March 23, 20 1 7.) Nothing in the record disputes that this disclosure about the Alabama and Kansas
orders

and

was never physically provided

t0 Rees. Instead, Zarinegar admits that the closest he,

PRM come t0 making a physical disclosure t0 Rees is footnote

1

in the

ARP,

PRM PPM:

Although not made a part 0f any representation in connection with this Offering,
background information related t0 the relationship between AHIT, American
Realty and the Company are detailed in AHIT’S public disclosures at
www.sec.g0V/edgar.
(R., p. 278,

the

emphasis added.) That footnote to the

Alabama and Kansas

make any

orders and sanctions and speciﬁcally disclaims that the

representation relevant t0 the

$550,800.03 in

PRM PPM makes no mention of Zarinegar or

PRM

offering. (1d,)

Rees testiﬁed

that

AHIT

ﬁlings

he invested his

PRM and ARP without ever being told 0r otherwise learning 0f Zarinegar’s Cease

and Desist Orders and the allegations therein from Alabama and Kansas.
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(R., p. 159.)

5.

Zarinegar moves Rees’s investment into a cannabis

company that becomes

For the several years (2014-2017) that Rees had money invested with

AHIT, he never received the
158-59.) In

advertised annual

March 2017, AHIT

Biotechnology,

Inc., a

changed AHIT’s name

t0

was not asked

Corix Bioscience,

7,

2017. (R.,

PRM, ARP, and

8% preferred return or any other payments.

(R., pp.

Zarinegar, as Chairman 0f the Board) purchased

company focused 0n

was dissolved on August
companies of ARP and

by

(led

worthless.

the production of cannabidol oil

Inc., a

p. 188.).

company focused 0n

the

IX

(CBD), and then

CBD business. ARP

Thus, Rees’s original investments in the real estate

PRM are now investments and shares in a CBD production company. Rees

t0 consent t0 this radical

change and he did not

ratify

it:

Q. Were you ever told you might be investing in a Cannabis operation?
A. No.
Q. Would that have affected your desire to invest had you known that?
A. Deﬁnitely
Q. For good 0r for bad?
A. Well, it’s legal in California, but it isn’t legal in Idaho, and I don’t want anything
t0 do with it.
(R., p. 159.)

Corix became essentially worthless, traded as a penny stock:

Q. What is the current status of your investment?
A. I have n0 idea. According to my phone, there is another company down there
that they transferred some things into it, CoriX Bioscience 0r something, and I think
it

was

listed at 5 cents a share yesterday.

Q. Yesterday?
A. (Witness nods.)
Q. Do you know What Corix Bioscience does?
A. Well, I understand that they are in the marijuana business 0r something in
California.

Q.

And that’s where your money is parked now?

A. Well,

I

don’t know.

Q. What is your best understanding of that?
A. My understanding is that they invested it in Corix Bioscience.
(R., pp. 156-57.) Therefore,

Rees

10st his entire

$550,800.03 investment in real

admits that Rees had no role in authorizing or ratifying the decision to merge

AHIT With a cannabis company.

(R., pp.

estate.

Zarinegar

PRM, ARP, and

713-26, 978-92.) Zarinegar does not dispute what occured
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and

that the cannabis business is

now

worthless, but he argues that the mergers and corporate

changes were not his decision and were

0f the
6.

PPMS

and Operating Agreements.3

show

Financial records

properly authorized and sufﬁciently disclosed by

all

way

(Id.)

money that Rees

that Zarinegar took

invested and directed

it

to his

personal use Without disclosing those intentions.

show Zarinegar moving Rees’s

Financial records

investor funds out of

PRM

and

into

Zarinegar’s personal accounts and then using those funds for day trading activities and other

November

personal expenditures. For example, 0n

which

totaled $172,283,

commingled with
later,

was deposited

into

25, 2015, Rees’s ﬁrst investment in

PRM’s Wells Fargo bank account ending in 1692 and

the $155,004.08 in the account (also investor funds). (R., p. 534.) Three

0n December

16th, Zarinegar transfered

himself by transferring $175,000 from

some

0r

all

from

PRM’s Wells Fargo bank

his personal

all

of

its

for

name of

Member or the Manager” and
Over the next

it).

(R., pp. 563, 568, 573.)

six

the

Company

are signed

by

or

its

subsidiaries

TD

The Operating

to July 3

and not

in the

name of any

months, Zarinegar used the $ 1 75,000 of PRM funds for his

own personal

TD Ameritrade account).

For example,

1

,

2016, Zarinegar used over $67,000 0f the funds for over 500 debit card

transactions, including purchases such as $14.88 at In

3

moved

Zarinegar. (R., pp. 242, 293, 266, 315, 1378.)

expenses and for day trading in stocks (out 0f his personal
1

the next day, Zarinegar

ARP and PRM, attached t0 their respective PPMS, state, “The Company shall hold

property in the

from January

it);

account t0 Zarinegar’s Wells

Wells Fargo checking account to his personal

Ameritrade account (Which had only $759.52 in

Agreements

weeks

of the Rees investment proceeds t0

Fargo personal checking account (which had only $3,439.65 in
the $175,000 again,

PRM,

Rees passed away December

11, 2018, less than

N Out Burger on March

two months

16,

2016, $90.99

after his deposition in this case.

(R. 1 53 .)
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at

the Blue Stag

Car Wash on

Bar on March 28, 2016, $36

May

10, 2016.

(R., pp.

at

Great Clips on April 20, 2016, and $24.99

at

Jacksons

578-80, 584-90, 598-609, 618-28, 641-54, 664-74.) In

addition, he used the rest 0f the balance of

ﬁmds

in stocks in his

day trade

t0

margin account,

regularly buying and selling shares in several different companies, including Facebook, Valeant

Pharmaceuticals, and Twitter. (Id)

ISSUES

II.

1.

Did

0N APPEAL

the District Court correctly admit into evidence the ﬁnancial records

from Wells

TD Ameritrade and the Cease and Desist orders and related certiﬁed
documents from Alabama and Kansas?

Fargo and

2.

Did the District Court correctly rule that the undisputed evidence shows that Zarinegar
committed securities fraud in four different ways that support the judgment for
$550,800 in restitution and $20,000 in penalties?

3.

Did

the District Court correctly rule that

it

had personal and subject matter jurisdiction

over Zarinegar and the claims against him?
4.

Did

the District Court’s grant 0f summary judgment Violate Zarinegar’s constitutional

right t0 a jury trial?

5.

Did

the District Court abuse

its

discretion in temporarily delaying the granting 0f

counsel’s motion to Withdraw 0r in refusing t0 allow Zarinegar t0 provide oral

argument

at

one hearing?
III.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard 0f review.
Zarinegar raised numerous arguments, some legal, some evidentiary, some factual, and

some
B.

procedural.

The

The various standards of review

are identiﬁed

and discussed below.

Court did not abuse its discretion by correctly ﬁnding that the ﬁnancial
records and Cease and Desist Orders were admissible.
District

Zarinegar objects t0 the District Court’s admission of two types of documents: (1) the

Cease and Desist Orders and related documents from Alabama and Kansas; and
bank/ﬁnancial records from Wells Fargo and

TD

(2)

the

Ameritrade. (Appellant’s Brief “AB”, pp. 15-
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20.)

The

District

Court did not abuse

to the relevant legal standards

its

discretion

by

correctly admitting these records pursuant

0f the public records and business records exceptions t0 the hearsay

rule. See, e.g., Safaris Unlimited,

LLC v.

Von Jones, 163 Idaho 874, 879, 421 P.3d 205, 210 (2018)
abuse 0f discretion, including “(3) acted

(for evidentiary rulings, four elements to evaluate for

consistently with relevant legal standards”).

1.

The Alabama and Kansas records were admitted

consistent With “relevant legal standards”

for the public records exception to the hearsay rule.

Regarding the Alabama and Kansas certiﬁed documents, the District Court ruled:

The Idaho Supreme Court has held

that a certiﬁed

copy 0f an out 0f state order
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144

satisﬁes the public records exception t0 the hearsay rule.

In addition t0 being certiﬁed, a
Idaho 882, 886, 173 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2007)
document is self—authenticating if it bears a seal 0f any state 0r department 0r

agency of a

and

state

Exhibit

an administrative order issued by the Alabama Securities
is signed by Joseph P. Borg, the

is

I

signed. I.R.E. 902(1).

is

Commission.

It

director of the

Alabama

Exhibit

J

is

Commission.
securities

contains ﬁndings 0f fact and

It

an

Securities

Commission.

administrative

order

Exhibit

K

is

also contains a state seal.

issued

also contains ﬁndings 0f fact

commissioner. The order contains a

It

and

is

by

the

Kansas

Securities

signed by Chris Biggs, the

state seal.

Kansas Securities
notarized. Exhibit L is a Consent

stipulation for consent order issued in the

Commission

case. It is signed by Zarinegar and is
Order issued in the Kansas Securities Commission case. It is signed by Chris Biggs,
the securities commissioner, and it contains the state seal. Plaintiff also
subsequently ﬁled certiﬁed copies 0f Exhibits J, K, and L.4

As

certiﬁed copies, the Court ﬁnds that these Exhibits meet the requirements 0f

Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8) and are self—authenticating.
(R., pp. 1998-99.)

District

On

appeal, Zarinegar has not challenged the evidentiary conclusions

Court regarding the Alabama and Kansas orders,

Alabama and Kansas

i.e.

by

the

Zarinegar does not dispute that the

orders were properly certiﬁed by those states and ﬁt Within the public records

exception to the hearsay rule. Instead, he claims the District Court improperly used judicial notice

4

A11 four orders/stipulations from

Alabama and Kansas,

originally Exhibits I-L,

resubmitted as certiﬁed copies, Exhibits III-LLL. (R.330-404, 1627-1709.)
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were

regarding the orders/stipulation from Alabama and Kansas. (AB, pp. 16- 1 7.) That argument should

be moot, as the District Court never mentioned judicial notice and did not admit the documents

from Alabama and Kansas based on judicial

notice.

In addition, Zarinegar collaterally attacks the orders/stipulation, claiming they were void

and inadmissible because “he never received any notice or he would have replied.” (AB, pp. 1718.)

That argument was never raised below, so Zarinegar

time on appeal. See,
not hold that a

that

it

trial

e.g.,

State

v.

court erred in

is

prohibited from raising

for the ﬁrst

it

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019)

making a decision on an

issue or a party’s position

(“We

will

on an issue

did not have the opportunity t0 address.”).
In addition, Zarinegar cannot point t0 any evidence in the record that supports his claim 0f

lack of notice. In fact, the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that he did receive notice.

For example, the Kansas and Alabama Cease and Desist Orders were entered
July

5th

and

6th,

C&D, conﬁrming

that Zarinegar

1666-70.) In addition, in his
the Kansas and

same time,

2007, and contained very similar allegations, (R., pp. 1630-63, 1677-1708.), and

Zarinegar signed a Stipulation regarding the Kansas

Kansas

at the

AHIT public

C&D that referenced the

was well aware of the

accusations in the

allegations against him. (R., pp.

ﬁlings in 2016, Zarinegar admits his knowledge ofboth

Alabama Orders and never mentions any claim of

lack 0f notice. (R., p. 800.)

Zarinegar does not point t0 any evidence in the record suggesting he has ever (during the
thirteen years) claimed lack of notice.

the four

2.

Alabama and Kansas

The

District Court did not abuse

certiﬁed public documents pursuant t0

its

discretion in admitting

IRE 803(8) and

901(7).

The bank/ﬁnancial records were admitted consistent With “relevant legal standards”
Business Records exception to the hearsay

rule.

Regarding certain ﬁnancial records, the District Court ruled:
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last

for the

The Court ﬁnds that Exhibits N—Z are admissible as Yu is a Wells Fargo Bank
employee who testiﬁed t0 the documents” authenticity and also that the account
documents were kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity. See
I.R.E. 803(6). As t0 AA and BB, the Court ﬁnds that although the evidentiary
deﬁciency was cured in an untimely manner (Le. AX’S Third Afﬁdavit was ﬁled
seven days before the summary judgment hearing), the Declaration from Rowley
complies With Rule 803(6).5

The bank statements

are submitted along With declarations

testifying as t0 their authenticity

business,

and

that they

were kept

which satisﬁes the business records exception

from bank employees

in the regular course

of

to the hearsay rule.

(R., pp. 1998-99.)

In challenging that ruling

other source and

on appeal, Zarinegar appears

makes reference

to

be pasting arguments from some

to

some unknown person and

incorrect facts:

The afﬁdavit merely describes What certain records allegedly reﬂect about the
account information of Mr. MacDonald, without attaching copies 0f the actual
records from his account. ...The afﬁdavit was signed 0n April 7, 2014, discussing
events Which happened years prior.
(AB,

p. 19.)

There

is

n0 Mr. MacDonald

in this case, copies 0fthe

Wells Fargo and TD Ameritrade

records are in the clerk’s record, and the Business Records Declarations from

from January 2017 and April 2019, not 2014.
argument

is

(R., pp.

unclear and deﬁcient. See AgStar Fin. Servs.,

Yu and Rowley are

472-75, 1752, 1757.) This appellate

ACA

v.

Nw. Sand

&

Gravel, Ina, 161

Idaho 801, 815—16, 391 P.3d 1271, 1285—86 (2017) (“When issues 0n appeal are not supported by
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they Will not be considered.

cited

on appeal
Both

if either authority 0r

Yu and Rowley provide

Wells Fargo and

and

5

and

does not

cite

declarations from Patrick

VVV.

is

lacking, not just if both are lacking”).

declarations that state they are the custodians of records for

TD Ameritrade and that set forth exactly What is required by IRE

(C). Zarinegar

The

argument

A party waives an issue

any evidence

803(6)(A), (B),

in the record that calls into question the veracity

Rowley regarding

the

TD Ameritrade records

(R.1719-21, 1752, 1757.)
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are Exhibits

TTT

of

the various statements

shown 0n those
fact, in his

from Wells Fargo and

statements,

which

TD Ameritrade 0r the ﬂow 0f funds and transactions

are all internally consistent

between the various accounts. In

Appellant Brief, in the Statement of Facts, Zarinegar describes the ownership of the

accounts, the

money ﬂow between

the accounts, and the use 0f the funds once they reached his

TD Ameritrade

account and he does not dispute those

did not abuse

discretion in admitting both the Wells Fargo and

its

facts.

(AB, pp. 11-12.) The

District

Court

TD Ameritrade business records

because they comply With the requirements of IRE 803 (6).
C.

District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Department
regarding four independent grounds 0f securities fraud.

The

The

District

Court granted summary judgment for the Department on

all

four independent

grounds 0f securities fraud raised by the Department:

(1) failing to disclose that

PRM violated Idaho Code

and

Plaintiff asserted that Zarinegar

PRM’s

§

30-14-501(2) by

investment funds would be transferred t0

Zarinegar’s personal bank accounts, (2) failing to disclose the Cease and Desist
Orders, and (3) failing to disclose that the real estate investment could be converted
into

a cannabis operation. Plaintiff also asserted that Zarinegar fraudulently

converted

PRM’S

funds to his personal use under Idaho Code § 30-14-501(4).

Accordingly, the Court ﬁnds there

is

n0 genuine issue 0f material

fact that

Defendants violated Idaho Code

§ 30-14-501(2) by failing t0 disclose the consent
orders, omitting or misrepresenting that the investment funds could be transferred

from

PRM

t0 Zarinegar,

and omitting 0r misrepresenting

that the real estate

investment could be transferred to a cannabis enterprise.
Accordingly, the Court ﬁnds there

is

n0 genuine issue 0f material

fact that Zarinegar

diverted investor money for his personal use without speciﬁcally disclosing that use

before receiving Rees’s investment money.
(R., pp.

2006-13.) Thus, in order to overturn the

summary judgment ﬁnding of

Zarinegar must show that the District Court erred With regard t0
securities fraud.

See AED,

Inc.

v.

KDC Investments,

181—82 (2013) (“This Court has held

that

when

all

LLC, 155 Idaho

four independent bases 0f

159, 164—65, 307 P.3d 176,

a district court grants
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securities fraud,

summary judgment on

multiple independent grounds, the appellant must successfully challenge

prevail

on

appeal.”). A11 orders granting

same standard applied by the
in favor

summary judgment

district court:

construing

all

all

of those grounds t0

are reviewed de

novo

utilizing the

disputed facts and reasonable inferences

0f Zarinegar, are there n0 genuine issues 0f material fact such that the Department

entitled t0

judgment

McGimpsey

as a matter 0f law. See, e.g.,

D&L

v.

is

Ventures, Ina, 165 Idaho

205, 443 P.3d 219, 224—25 (2019).

1.

The Cease and Desist Orders were material and not
The

t0

ﬁrst ground of securities fraud

Rees Without disclosing

t0

Rees

from both Alabama and Kansas

disclosed.

was Zarinegar’s seven sales ofARP and PRM

that Zarinegar

securities

had been the subject of Cease and Desist Orders

in 2007. Zarinegar

makes two arguments

be deemed t0 have notice of these orders based on

AHIT

for error: (1)

Rees should

public ﬁling disclosures and (2) Idaho

regulations state that such orders do not have to be disclosed. (AB, pp. 22-24.) Neither argument

is

legally correct.

The

facts regarding these

supra Part I.C.1-4.) The two

Alabama and Kansas

PPMs used t0

orders are not disputed. (See discussion

advertise and sell the

ARP and PRM securities did not

disclose either Cease and Desist Order. Zarinegar only disclosed these

public ﬁlings for a separate company:
public ﬁlings 0f AHIT

This offering

is

is

in the

two orders by way 0f the

AHIT. Zarinegar’s only written statement to Rees about the

PRM PPM and states,

not an offering of any securities of American Realty or

AHIT

Alihough not made a part of any representation in connection with this offering,
background information related t0 the relationship between AHIT, American
Realty and the Company are detailed in AHIT’S public disclosures at
www.sechV/edgar. Furthermore, audited ﬁnancials outlining the value 0f the
1,000,000 shares of AHIT stock owned by the Company are set forth therein.

Based on those undisputed
relied

on the

AHIT

facts, the District

Court

stated,

“There

is

ﬁling, given the explicit disclaimer regarding

n0 reason [Rees] should have

AHIT
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in the

PRM PPM.” (R.,

p.

2009 (emphasis added).) In other words, the

asserted

by Zarinegar

need

review the

t0

securities.

The

(the

PPM for PRM) was

AHIT

District

a footnote that explicitly told Rees that he did not

public ﬁlings for any representations regarding the sales of

Court correctly concluded that the disclosure in the

District

a disclosure to Rees, an investor in

AHIT

ﬁlings

PRM

was not

ARP and PRM.

In fact, the District Court could have said a lot

and Desist Orders were not disclosed
securities to

Court noted that the only “disclosure”

t0 Rees.

more t0 support its conclusion that the Cease

For example, there

is

n0 dispute

that Zarinegar sold

Rees on seven separate occasions without disclosing the Cease and Desist Orders:

May 4,

2014, 5 units 0f ARP, $50,000

June 25, 2014, 10 units ofARP, $100,000

December

May

19,

2015, 10 units

December

ofARP, $50,000
ofARP, $100,000

24, 2014, 5 units

899%.“!‘91‘

2015, ? units of PRM, $172,283

1,

January 26, 2016, ? units ofPRM, $18,517.03
February 26, 2016, 4 units 0f PRM, $60,000
(See discussion supra Part I.C.2-3.) Each 0f those sales constituted securities fraud based on this
material omission. In fact,

by

the time he disclosed these negative facts in an

January 19, 2016, Zarinegar had already

made ﬁve

rights. See, e.g., I.C. §

affecting the

proceeded to

PPM

t0

ﬁve prior
sell

make

learned of the

ﬁling on

fraudulent sales t0 Rees totaling $472,283.

Zarinegar then could have tried t0 remedy his fraud on

by providing them with the same

AHIT

ARP

and

disclosure (that he put in the

PRM investors (including Rees)

AHIT ﬁling) and offering rescission

30-14-410. Instead, Zarinegar said nothing to Rees about the non-disclosure

sales,

and Zarinegar changed nothing

in the

ARP 0r PRM PPMs. Zarinegar

PRM securities t0 Rees on two more occasions and without amending the PRM

the

same disclosure

that

he had included in the

Alabama and Kansas Cease and Desist

AHIT

Orders.
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ﬁlings. Thus,

Rees never

Instead of making the full disclosure of his prior bad acts in the

other investors (thereby risking the loss of the sales to

all investors),

AHIT

caught in the non-disclosure and then tried t0 claim that his

and

that

Rees was

argument

at fault for

not discovering

it.

that runs counter to the purposes

The

PPMs

given t0 Rees and

Zarinegar waited until he got
disclosure

was good enough

District Court correctly rej ected that illogical

of the Idaho Uniform Securities Act: accurate,

understandable (not hidden) disclosures t0 potential investors so they can
decisions. See, e.g., Basic Inc.

v.

Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988)

(“We have recognized time

and again, a ‘fundamental purpose’ 0f the various Securities Acts, ‘was
0f

full

make informed

t0 substitute a

philosophy

disclosure for the philosophy 0f caveat emptor and thus t0 achieve a high standard 0f

business ethics in the securities industry”).

Zarinegar also argues that the non-disclosure was not material because Idaho regulations

do not require disclosure of the
12.01.08.059.02(a) and 17

CFR

orders. Zarinegar misreads the regulations.

He

cites t0

230.262, Which are regulations relevant to Whether

prohibited (under these “bad actor” regulations) from selling

its

at issue

PRM

was

securities without a registration

statement in reliance 0n the Reg. D, Rule 505 exemption. The ability of ARP and/or

an exemption from registration was never

IDAPA

PRM t0 use

below, so these regulations are irrelevant.

Neither regulation says anything about what must be disclosed to investors in order t0 avoid being
liable for fraud

were

by material omission. The

District

Court correctly concluded that these regulations

irrelevant.

The

test for

what had

to

be disclosed

to Rees,

i.e.

what was

material,

is

an objective

long-ago established by the U.S. Supreme Court and correctly applied by the District Court:

An

omitted fact

is

material if there

shareholder would consider

it

is

a substantial likelihood that a reasonable

important in deciding

how

t0 vote.

Put another

way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been Viewed by the reasonable investor as having signiﬁcantly altered
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test

mix” of information made available.
Only if the established omissions
“so
are
obviously important t0 an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ 0n

the “total

the question of materiality”

resolved “as a matter 0f law”

TSC Indus.,

Inc.

v.

is

the ultimate issue 0f materiality appropriately

by summary judgment.

Northway, Ina, 426 U.S. 438, 449—50 (1976); see State

Shama

v.

Res. Ltd.

P’ship, 127 Idaho 267, 273, 899 P.2d 977, 983 (1995) (“These misrepresented facts [that the

securities

and the broker-dealer were unregistered] are material

because the information

may have resulted

decision”); see also Gerhard W. Gohler,

causation nor reliance

is

in

and investors

to the offerees

an alteration 0f the offerees or investors investment

IRA

v.

Wood, 919 P.2d 561 (Utah 1996) (neither

an element 0f securities fraud); Uniform Securities Act

§

509 cmt. 4

(2002) (noting that “neither causation nor reliance has been held t0 be an element 0f a private cause

0f action under the precursor to Section 509(b)”).

The

know

District

Court correctly concluded that any reasonable investor would have wanted to

about these Alabama and Kansas Cease and Desist Orders that (1) describe

allowed himself to be afﬁliated for four years With a business that was doing

how

PPOs and PPMs that

were fraudulent, working With many unsavory individuals, and committing many
Violations; (2) prohibited Zarinegar

from

selling securities in those

two

Zarinegar

and

states;

securities

(3) disclosed

Zarinegar’s personal history 0f bankruptcy, failed investments, client lawsuits, and client
complaints.

sole) owner,

how

The PPMs

for

ARP

and

PRM

manager, and ofﬁcer 0f both

investor

money was

important” t0 also

know

utilized, so

disclosed that Zarinegar

was

the

key (and sometimes

ARP and PRM, with full control of both companies and

any reasonable investor would consider

it

“so obviously

about these Cease and Desist Orders that put Zarinegar’s integrity,

security law compliance, business and investing acumen, and decision-making in great doubt.

Numerous

other

courts

have

similarly

granted

summary judgment regarding

indisputable materiality of prior bad acts of key management. See, e.g., S.E. C.
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v.

the

Merck. Capital,

LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 771—72 (11th
against identical instruments

in

Whether management

is

is

Cir.

2007) (“The existence 0f a

clearly relevant to a reasonable investor,

&

by federal and

state courts against similar

When

and

desist order

who is naturally interested

following the law in marketing the securities”);

F.Supp. 635, 646 (N.D.N.Y.1979) (material omission
orders entered

state cease

SEC

v.

failed t0 disclose cease

Para, 468

and

predecessor interests); Breard v.

desist

Saclmoﬂ

Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 143—44 (2d Cir.1991) (failure t0 disclose that key ﬁnancier and

guarantor had pled guilty t0 fraud in connection with similar scheme, if proven, was material);
U.S. S.E.C.

v.

Levine, 671 F. Supp. 2d 14, 27—28 (D.D.C. 2009) (“It cannot be disputed that a

reasonable investor would want t0

know Whether

the person they are sending their

money

order to purchase a stock has been previously found to have violated the securities laws.”);

to in

SEC v.

Kirkland, 521 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1303 (M.D.Fla.2007) (information regarding a person’s prior

disciplinary history

would

assist investors in

judging a defendant’s “veracity and Whether

businesses were legitimate and sound”); S.E.C.
L, 2013

v.

[the]

Provident Royalties, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-01238-

WL 53 14354, at *4—6 (N.D. TeX. Sept. 23, 2013) (defendant admitted

it

was

relevant that

he did not disclose cease and desist order from Michigan).
In fact, Zarinegar’s disclosure 0f the information about these Cease and Desist Orders in

his

AHIT

needed
err in

i.e.

t0

ﬁlings

is

a key admission by Zarinegar that he

knew such

be disclosed t0 investors. (See discussion supra Part

ﬁnding

this non—disclosure

information was material and

I.C.4.)

The

District Court did not

0f the Cease and Desist Orders was material as a matter 0f law,

“so obviously important t0 an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ 0n the question 0f

materiality,”

2.

and therefore

securities fraud.

The possible conversion

t0 a cannabis

company was

The second ground of securities fraud was
disclosures that uniformly said this

material and not disclosed.

the seven sales of securities t0

was an investment

in real estate companies,
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Rees pursuant

to

however shortly

after

Rees invested, the company converted

t0 a cannabis

company. In

his appellate brief,

Zarinegar does not dispute that this radical change happened (less than three years after Rees’s
ﬁrst investment and slightly

more than one year

Zarinegar, however, claims this

is

after his last investment).

not securities fraud because (1)

it

authority and therefore not his fault and (2) that such a possibility

Rees

in the boilerplate

0f the PPMs.

(Id.)

The

(AB, pp.

was not

13, 24-25.)

his sole decision 0r

was adequately disclosed

to

District Court correctly rejected these excuses.

Again, the material facts here are not disputed. (See discussion supra Part I.C.2-3,

&

5.)

Zarinegar and his companies uniformly told Rees that he was investing in real estate investment

companies, With proceeds of the investment to be used almost exclusively 0n buying real estate
assets that

would then generate

rents

income

for the business

any of the disclosures, including the boilerplate

in the

and

its

investors. (1d,)

PPMS, would suggest

to

Nothing

in

any reasonable

investor that this investment might not actually be in real estate investment company. (1d,) In 20 1 7,

however, these real estate companies merged With a cannabis company and the resulting company

was a cannabis company, not a
change.

(Id.)

The

real estate investment

possibility that

Rees investments and ownership

unilaterally transferred to a cannabis

was never

disclosed. (1d,)

The

company. (Id) Rees did not approve of this

company

(0r

interests

any other non-real

could 0r would be

estate investing business)

possibility that all real estate (including those purchased

by Rees’s

investment), Which protected his investment, might be liquidated and proceeds invested in a

different business

was not

disclosed. (Id)

Based on those indisputable

facts, the District

Court concluded:

and PRM’S Operating Agreements and PPM are replete with statements and
representations that the business of the companies is real estate. There is n0 genuine
issue of material fact that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would have Viewed the disclosure of the possibility that investor funds could be
converted from a real estate venture to a cannabis venture would have signiﬁcantly
altered the total mix of the information available. Rees testiﬁed that he would never

ARP
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he had known that his investment would have gone toward a
cannabis enterprise, especially because it is illegal in Idaho. In Viewing the

have invested

if

documents as a whole, a reasonable investor would not have concluded 0r been put
on notice that their investment could be transferred from real estate t0 cannabis.
The omission 0f this fact was material.
(R., p.

not

2012.) This conclusion

know

in

2014-2016

is

common

sense.

that this transformation

It

does not matter that Zarinegar claims he did

would happen and did not have

happening in 2017.6 Zarinegar’s intent (innocent 0r otherwise) in

moved

investment could someday be

See State

irrelevant.

v.

Shama

into

is

There

is

§ 30-14-501(2). Zarinegar

expect to

know

in

it

its

materiality are all that

at

must be proven. See

does not even attempt t0 dispute that any reasonable investor would

What type of business he was

6949289,

omit to

nothing in the language 0f these provisions that indicates scienter

the investor’s consent. See, e.g., Sec.

WL

‘to

unlawful for any person

investing,

What type of

would purchase, and whether those answers might dramatically change

CIV, 2017

estate, is

Res. Ltd. P’ship, 127 Idaho 267, 272, 899 P.2d 977, 982 (1995)

required to establish fraud”). Non-disclosure and

LC.

it

failing t0 disclose that Rees’s

an entirely different business, unrelated to real

(“The relevant portions 0f the Idaho Securities Act make
state a material fact’

control over

assets his investments

in the future

and without

& Exch. Comm ’n v. Lottonet Operating Corp, No.

*13 (S.D.

Fla.

Mar. 31, 2017)

(citing

17-21033-

numerous cases

for the

proposition that “[m]isrepresentations regarding the use 0f investors' funds are material” as a

matter of law). The District Court did not err in ﬁnding that this was material as a matter of law

and therefore

6

securities fraud.

Zarinegar points to nothing in the record supporting his claim that he did not have a role in this

conversion from a

REIT

to a cannabis business.

The record shows

that Zarinegar

was chairman

of the board of directors, CFO, and treasurer 0f AHIT at the time 0f the conversion. (R., pp. 278,
188.) Additional documents outside the record could further conﬁrm Zarinegar’s key role in the

merger and conversion, had

this issue

been seriously questioned below.
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3.

The possible transfer of Rees’s investment into Zarinegar’s personal accounts was material
and not disclosed.

The ﬁnal fraud by material omission was Rees’s investment 0f $172,000
Zarinegar disclosing that some or

all

in

PRM Without

0f those funds would then be moved into Zarinegar’s

Ameritrade account and used for stock trading and $67,000 0f debit card expenses.

On

TD

appeal,

Zarinegar makes a vague three-sentence argument Without citing to any factual 0r legal support:

Appellant did not obtain the funds “wrongfully” and the property was not
0r “possessed” by the investor at the time of the purported conversion.
Moreover, there is n0 evidence these expenses weren’t used toward PRM real-

“owned

estate, to

purchase additional shares 0f AHIT from Appellant, reimbursements to

Appellant 0r other investments pursuant t0 the operating agreement 0r other

approved business expenses.
In addition, once again, the right 0f Appellant

to

do so was

fully disclosed to

the investor.

(AB,

p. 25.)

That argument

815—16, 391 P.3d

at

is

insufﬁcient as a matter of law. See AgStar Fin. Servs., 161 Idaho at

1285—86 (appellate issue not supported by propositions 0f law,

authority, or

argument will not be considered).
Again, the relevant facts are not in dispute. (See discussion supra Part I.C.6.) In his
appellate brief, Statement 0f the Facts, Zarinegar concedes that the

$172,283 0f investment proceeds in

bank records show

PRM went ﬁrst into the PRM’S business

that Rees’s

account, then were

transferred (as part of a $175,000 transfer) into Zarinegar’s personal account, and ﬁnally

transferred into Zarinegar’s

TD

TD Ameritrade account.

were

(AB, pp. 11-12.) Zarinegar concedes that the

Ameritrade records show that Rees’s funds were then used for stock trading and $67,000 of

debit card transactions. (1d,)

Zarinegar argues that he was entitled to pay himself the $175,000 out of PRM’S account,
including out of Rees’s investment in

PRM

that

was

Zarinegar’s claim that “the right 0f Appellant t0 d0 so

was

sitting in

PRM’S

account. However,

fully disclosed to the investor” is

wholly

unsupported. Zarinegar points t0 nothing in the record t0 suggest that he told Rees that Rees’s
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investment of $172,283 would, less than a month after the investment, be used t0 help pay

personal

checking account and

to Zarinegar 0r otherwise transferred t0 Zarinegar’s personal

$175,000

TD

Ameritrade account for use in stock trading and debit card expenses. The District

Court did not

ﬁnding

err in

that this use

0f Rees’s investment was not disclosed and would be “so

obviously important t0 an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question 0f

TSC Indus., 426

materiality.”

for this third fraud

4.

U.S. at 449—50.

Summary judgment was

therefore also appropriate

by material omission.

Zarinegar diverted investor funds to himself without prior disclosure.
This fourth count of securities fraud

under a different subsection 0f fraud:

To

of a security

divert investor

“It is

is

somewhat

different

from the other

three, as

unlawful for a person, in connection With the

money t0

However,

funds out of

it

PRM

arises out

and

business. Zarinegar does not

As

of essentially the same

into Zarinegar’s

TD

falls

sale

the personal use of the issuer, offeror or seller,

Without speciﬁcally disclosing that use before receiving the investor’s money.”
501(4).

it

facts as discussed above: transferring

Ameritrade account and spending

make new arguments

I.C. §

it

30-14-

Rees’s

on non-PRM

regarding this fourth fraud count. (AB, p. 25.)

stated above, Zarinegar does not dispute the ﬁnancial records

showing Rees’s money

being transferred into Zarinegar’s personal accounts and then being spent on matters unrelated to

PRM’s business:

stock trading and

like haircuts. Zarinegar

ﬁve hundred

debit card expenses for various personal expenses

does not argue that he told Rees

investment) that any of his investment funds would be

(at

moved

0r used for stock trading 0r for haircuts and restaurant meals.

any time,

let

alone prior t0 the

into Zarinegar’s personal accounts

The District Court rightly concluded:

PRM property t0 his personal bank
n0 showing (and n0 genuine issue 0f material fact) that the ﬁmds
were then expended for anything other than personal matters (Le. haircuts, pest
services, and car washes, t0 name a few). His intent regarding the transfers is
It is

undisputed that Zarinegar transferred

accounts. There

is

irrelevant.
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(R., pp. 2013.)

The

personal accounts but that
Zarinegar’s

company property is

t0

was

still

the

Form

PRM

money, which contradicted the requirements of

“the Operating

Agreement and PPM speciﬁcally

stated that

be kept in the name of the company and not in the name of any Manager.”

PPM

Company

operation 0f the

said in the

it

own company documents:

(1d,) In addition,

he moved the money into his

District Court rejected Zarinegar’s excuse that

D notice

stated that investment funds

in serving as

for

PRM

were

t0

be used “towards the general

Manager 0f American Realty”

(R., p. 278),

and Zarinegar

(ﬁled in Idaho just after Rees invested his $172,000) that n0

proceeds would be paid to executives like himself. (R., pp. 320-28.) Zarinegar submitted no
evidence to support any assertion that stock trading and $67,000 in debit card expenses from
Zarinegar’s

TD

Ameritrade account (rather than from the

managing ARP. The

District Court did not err in

PRM business

ﬁnding

account) were related t0

securities fraud through fraudulent

conversion of investor funds: the undisputed facts showed that Zarinegar used some 0r all ofRees’s

investment

money for Zarinegar’s own personal uses, Without prior disclosure 0f this use t0

Rees.

In sum, the District Court correctly found that Zarinegar committed securities fraud in

numerous ways:

(1)

seven sales of

ARP

and

PRM

Desist Orders against Zarinegar; (2) seven sales of
the possibility that

securities without disclosing the

ARP

Rees might not actually be investing

(3) the ﬁrst (0fthree) sale

and

PRM

Cease and

securities Without disclosing

in a future real estate investment

company;

0f PRM securities without disclosing that the investment proceeds would

be transferred out of PRM accounts and into Zarinegar’s personal accounts for stock trading and
debit card expenses; and (4) the ﬁrst (0f three) sale of

PRM

securities without disclosing that

Zarinegar was going t0 use the investment proceeds for his personal use.
are disputed.

Summary judgment was

properly granted as t0

all

None of the material facts

of the frauds.
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D. The District Court did not err in ruling that
jurisdiction over Zarinegar

In

some of his incoherent

and the

it

securities

writings ﬁled from

had personal and subject matter
fraud claims against him.

May through October 2019,

Zarinegar

arguments that suggested he was challenging personal and subject matter jurisdiction.

made

He

then

provided oral arguments regarding jurisdiction during the September 30th hearing. (Tr. 73:2478z21.)

The

District

[I]t’s

Court ruled:

alleged that this court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction inasmuch

as the Department has argued that the defendant, Mr. Zarinegar, violated the Idaho
Uniform Securities Act found at Idaho Code Section 30-14-10, et seq., and
submitted to the jurisdiction of this court pursuant t0 Idaho Code Section 5-5 14 by
transacting business Within this state. The case 0f Troupis v. Summer, the Idaho
Supreme Court in 2009 said jurisdiction over the subject matter is the right 0f the
court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases. And this court has adopted

the presumption that courts of general jurisdiction have subj ect matter jurisdiction

unless a party can

show

otherwise. Here the defendant has failed t0

show

that the

court lacks personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction under either the
constitution or the laws 0f the State of Idaho.

And

so this court does deny motions

pressed by the defendant regarding issues ofjurisdiction both in personam as well
as subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the defendant failed to assert the issues 0f
jurisdiction

by motion before ﬁling a responsive pleading 0r ﬁling any other

motions and, therefore, the motion
Procedure Section 12(h)(1).
(Tr. 7922-80:

1 .)

See, e.g., State

The
September

IRCP

v.

untimely under Idaho Rules 0f Civil

District Court did not err. Jurisdiction is a legal issue that is

reviewed de novo.

Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).

District Court correctly noted that a challenge to personal jurisdiction

14, 2018,

When Zarinegar ﬁled an Answer and

was waived on

did not challenge personal jurisdiction.

12(h)(1)(“A party waives any defense listed in subsection (b)(2) [lack of personal

jurisdiction]

IRCP

The

is

by

failing to assert

it

by motion before ﬁling a responsive pleading

4.1(a) (“The voluntary appearance of a party or service 0f

....”);

see also

any pleading by the party

constitutes voluntary submission t0 the personal jurisdiction 0f the court”). Zarinegar

attorneys for not raising the issue and argues that he be allowed to raise
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it

pro

se,

blames his

approximately

one year

after the rules required

exception. See,

e.g.,

State

v.

it

t0

be raised. Zarinegar points to n0 case law supporting such an

Aguilar, 103 Idaho 578, 579—80, 651 P.2d 512, 513—14 (1982) (by

not raising a timely afﬁrmative defense,

deemed

to

have consented to court’s jurisdiction).

In addition, the long-arm statute provides jurisdiction over Zarinegar

member of both

PRM and ARP,

Who, as the managing

sold his companies’ securities to an Idaho resident:

whether 0r not a citizen or resident of this state,
Any person, ﬁrm, company
who in person 0r through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
to the jurisdiction of the courts 0f
company
any cause 0f action arising from the doing 0f any of said acts:

thereby submits said person, ﬁrm,
this state as t0

(a)

The

transaction of any business Within this state

...;

Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514.
Zarinegar argues that he can avoid personal jurisdiction because he was not the salesperson

Who

spoke directly With Idaho resident Rees. The long-arm statute addresses that situation and

exercises jurisdiction over the principal. See, e.g., Knutsen

v.

Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 15 1, 124 P.3d

1024, 1027 (2005) (“Our long-arm statute works only in the reverse, allowing a court t0 exercise

personal jurisdiction over a principal

it

is

When its

agent has sufﬁcient contacts With Idaho.”). Further,

clear that Zarinegar explicitly consented t0 personal jurisdiction in Idaho

and purposely

directed his activities at Idaho residents and the litigation arises out of those activities. Zarinegar

ﬁled the Form
their sales

D Notice with the SEC as the Executive Ofﬁcer for both PRM and ARP, disclosing

of securities.

(R., pp. 190-94, 270-74.)

Securities Administrator 0f

any

state as the

in that state if the lawsuit arises out

Zarinegar also ﬁled the
t0

Rees

Consent

Form D Notices

in Idaho. (R., pp. 319-328.)

to Service

of the

of Process” that

Both forms

state that the issuer is

appointing the

agent for service 0f process and service can be

activities

0f the sale 0f securities in that

in Idaho, as required,

The ﬁlings

states that

when ARP and PRM

in Idaho contained the required

PRM and ARP:
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made

state. (Id).

sold securities

“U-2 Uniform

hereby consent that any such action 0r proceeding against it may be commenced in
any court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue Within the States so
designated hereunder

service ofprocess

upon the ofﬁcers so designated with the

was organized

same

effect as if the undersigned

State

and have been served lawﬁllly with process

0r created under the laws 0f the
in that State.

Zarinegar signed that U-2 document and placed an

(R., pp. 326-27.)

for

by

which the person executing

form

this

is

X by Idaho as “all the States

appointing the designated Ofﬁcer 0f each State as

its

attorney in that State for receipt 0f service 0f process.” (Id.)

The

ARP

PPM for PRM

stated that Zarinegar

stated that Zarinegar

was

was

the Chief Executive

the

manager and

Ofﬁcer and

sole

PRM

member. The

was

PPM for

the Manager. (R., p.

208.) So, Zarinegar controlled both companies and thus also controlled their efforts to sell

securities. (R., p. 278.) Zarinegar, as

Jack

Combs and

others

who

Manager and CEO,

responsible for the actions of his agent

cold-called Rees in Idaho. (R., p. 155.)

Subscription Agreements for the purchase 0f the

Who

is

ARP

and

When

Rees signed the

PRM securities, Zarinegar is the party

signed (0r had a signature block he should have signed) as Manager for

ARP

and

PRM.

pp. 292, 1054, 1076, 1105, 1135, 1143, 1149.) Zarinegar also signed, as President, the four

Membership Certiﬁcate of Interest.
from Idaho

to accounts for

transferred a signiﬁcant

In sum, Rees

all

(R., pp. 1056, 1087, 1110, 1139.)

Rees sent

(R.,

ARP

his $550,800.03

PRM and ARP and Zarinegar controlled those accounts and eventually

amount of those funds

may not have

to his personal accounts.

spoken with Zarinegar, but

it

was Zarinegar Who orchestrated

aspects 0f the sale 0f securities to an Idaho resident, including having his agents cold-call an

Idaho resident, signing the seven contracts with the Idaho resident, signing the ownership unit
certiﬁcates for Rees, and accepting the

case arise out ofthose actions

money from

by Zarinegar,

i.e.

his fraud in the sale 0f those securities t0

resident. Personal jurisdiction is easily established

Dep’t ofFin.

v.

Tenney, 124 Idaho 243,

the Idaho resident. A11 of the claims in this

based 0n these undisputed

24749, 858 P.2d

facts.

an Idaho

See

State,

782, 786—88 (Ct. App. 1993) (“The
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nature and quality of these contacts support a ﬁnding that

at

Tenney purposefully directed

activities

Idaho residents such that he should have reasonably anticipated the possibility of being haled

into court in Idaho”).

Regarding subj ect matter jurisdiction,

this

Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Court
is

stated:

the right of the court to exercise

power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but
the abstract power t0 try a case 0f the kind 0r character of the one

judicial

rather

pending; and not *80 **1 141 whether the particular case

is

a cause of action, 0r under the particular facts

before the court in

is triable

which it is pending, because 0f some ofthe inherent facts
be developed during trial.

one that presents

that exist

and may

15 Idaho 488, 494—95, 98 P. 842, 844 (1908). This Court has adopted a

presumption that courts 0f general jurisdiction have subj ect matter jurisdiction
unless a party can

Troupis

v.

show

Summer, 148 Idaho

correctly noted that

it

had

otherwise.

77, 79—80,

218 P.3d 1138, 1140—41 (2009). The

District Court

Uniform

Securities Act,

subj ect matter jurisdiction pursuant t0 the Idaho

Which grants the Department the
30-14-603 (“the administrator

ability t0 bring civil litigation t0 enforce the Act.

may

maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to

enjoin the act, practice, or course 0f business and t0 enforce compliance”).

not err in concluding that

E.

it

Idaho Code §

The

had both personal and subj ect matter jurisdiction

District Court did

t0 resolve t0 case.

The District Court did not violate any rights related to a jury trial or proceeding pro se
and did not abuse its discretion regarding counsel’s motion t0 Withdraw.
1.

The grant of summary judgment does not

Violate

anV iurV

trial right.

In the Appellant Brief, Zarinegar devotes one paragraph to his appeal issue that he

“denied his constitutional right to a jury
sentence t0 jury

trial rights in

trial.”

(AB, pp.

14, 30.) In fact,

was

he devotes only one

a civil case. (Id.) For that reason alone, this argument should be

rejected, as Zarinegar has not sufﬁciently

argued the issue 0n appeal. See AgStar Fin. Servs., 161
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Idaho

at

815—16, 391 P.3d

authority, or

at

argument will not be considered).

The argument should
for jury

1285—86 (appellate issue not supported by propositions 0f law,

trial,

but

it

also

be rejected on a substantive

did not proceed to jury

trial for

resolution of a civil lawsuit against a defendant Without a jury

is

originally set

one reason: the Department was granted

summary judgment 0n its claims and requested remedies. Zarinegar appears

position

was

basis. This case

trial is

contrary t0 decades 0f law establishing the importance of

be arguing that any

t0

unconstitutional. That

summary judgment

for the

efﬁcient resolution of litigation based on the law where there are n0 material facts in dispute. See,

e.g.,

Parklane Hosiery C0.

Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (“The Seventh

v.

never been interpreted in the rigid manner advocated by the petitioners.

On

Amendment

the contrary,

has

many

procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury’s historic domain have

been found not

t0

be inconsistent With the Seventh Amendment. See

United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319—321

Amendment)”); McGimpsey
(no Violation ofjury

v.

trial right

D&L

(summary judgment does not

arguments

at a

229—30 (2019)

based 0n grant 0f summary judgment); see also Anderson
Slatkz'n,

v.

Violate the Seventh

525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th

Delaying the granting of counsel’s motion t0 withdraw and refusing t0
oral

& Deposit C0.

Ventures, Ina, 165 Idaho 205, 443 P.3d 219,

Lobby, Ina, 477 U.S. 242, 251—52 (1986); In re
2.

Fidelity

v.

Liberty

Cir. 2008).

let

Zarinegar offer

hearing was not an abuse of discretion.

Zarinegar argues that his right t0 proceed pro se was violated

when

the District Court

refused t0 immediately grant Zarinegar’s counsel of record’s motion t0 Withdraw and instead
required that counsel present

PRM and Zarinegar’s oral arguments at the hearing on May 2

This argument should be rejected for several reasons: Zarinegar did not properly
standard of review; the Court did not abuse

it

its

discretion;

and

if there

was adequately remedied and not prejudicial.
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1

,

20 1 9.

cite to the

was any abuse of discretion,

Once appointed, counsel may Withdraw only upon obtaining leave 0f the
Leave of Court Required. T0 withdraw from an
an attorney must ﬁrst obtain leave 0f the court.
(1)

action, except

by

court to d0 so:

substitution,

When Granted. By written order the court may grant leave t0 Withdraw for gﬂl

(2)

cause and upon such conditions 0r sanctions as will prevent delay 0r preiudice to
the parties.

IRCP

11.3(b) (emphasis added).

motion

to

Withdraw (and conditioning

abuse of discretion. See,

App.

The decision

Jan. 4,

e.g.,

it

Hawkins

upon

v.

to temporarily withhold granting

ﬁrst arguing the pending motions)

State,

No. 44725, 2018

2018) (“Pursuant to the plain language 0f this

a motion t0 Withdraw

is

discretionary, but such

motion

WL 283779,

is

at

an attorney’s
reviewed for
*7 (Idaho Ct.

rule, a court’s decision t0 grant or

may

only be granted upon a showing of

‘good cause. 9” ). The decision t0 preclude Zarinegar from also presenting oral argument

May 21“ hearing is
2010

Wisdom

also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

WL 9590206, at *11

(Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2010)

(“We review

trial

0f discretion,

court

this

may limit 0r deny such

argument”).

trial court: (1)

As

deny

Oral argument

is

oral

not

When reviewing an allegation 0f abuse

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently With the

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

v.

Mallo, No. 36616,

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2)

acted Within the outer boundaries 0f

Lunneborg

at the

Court reviews four essentials:

Whether the

decision

v.

the decision t0

argument 0n a motion for an abuse of discretion. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D);
required; a

deny

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

by the exercise 0f reason.

My Fun Life,

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

a preliminary matter, Zarinegar again did not address the standard of review for his

claim 0f error and did not

cite t0

any case law relevant

to the facts

0f What actually occurred. His

conclusory statements about the denial of a right t0 proceed pro se can be rejected as fatally
deﬁcient. See State

v.

Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575, n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 (2017);

Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016).
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Cummings

v.

On the

substance, the District Court did not abuse

its

discretion.

The

District

Court did not

preclude Zarinegar from proceeding pro se, as Zarinegar claims. Rather, the District Court
temporarily precluded Zarinegar from making oral arguments during the hearing 0n
instead requiring that his recently ﬁred counsel

PRM

at the

hearing.

would make

In other words, consistent with

it

,

20 1 9,

the oral arguments for Zarinegar and

IRCP

conditioned the granting 0f the motion t0 Withdraw 0n Brian

long enough t0 provide oral argument 0n the motions

May 2 1

11.3(b)(2), the District Court

Webb

Legal remaining in the case

had ﬁled and

briefed, in order to prevent

delay or prejudice t0 the Department:

Ithink that so long as

we have competent counsel

representing the defendants, I’m

going to hear the summary judgment arguments today. I’m going to take the matter
under advisement, and then I’ll also take the motion for leave t0 Withdraw under
advisement.
I would plan 0n issuing a memorandum decision 0n the summary
judgment motions and at the same time issue a decision on the motion for leave to
Withdraw at Which time I think I would likely grant the motion for leave to Withdraw
at the time I issue the decision 0n the summary judgments. But seems like all the
work has been done and I think it’s best to hear it now While we have competent
counsel Who’s able to d0 so.
(Tr. 33:5-24.);

see also R., p. 2014 (“Given the voluminous ﬁlings that were already before the

Court, and the prejudice and delay

it

would

cause, the Court considered

all

of the above Motions

before considering Defendants’ Motion t0 Withdraw”).

The

District

Court understood

a discretionary matter

left

this

was

discretionary: “ultimately

factors that

my decision and it’s

With the court.” (Tr. 2926-7.) After discussing the issue

with both Zarinegar and attorney Brian Webb, the District Court

0n several

it’s

had been openly discussed:

made

at great length

a reasoned decision based

(1) Zarinegar’s counsel

had ﬁled and briefed

0f the motions and was therefore ﬁllly versed in the relevant and key issues;

(2) Zarinegar

all

had

ﬁled numerous documents that suggested he did not understand the legal issues and was attempting
to raise

at the

numerous nonsensical arguments

May

21“ hearing and refused

(R., pp.

1442-1521); (3) Zarinegar addressed the Court

t0 give straight-forward

answers to simple questions
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(e.g.,

“Court: Well, are you 0r are you not Sean Zarinegar? Zarinegar: Again, I’m here as a grantor and

beneﬁciary to that name.” Tr. 5 :2 1 -24); and (4) Zarinegar indicated that he and PRM did not intend
t0 hire

new

counsel to argue these motions

At the end of the
proven

t0

any future hearing.

at

hearing, the District Court

be sound; that Brian

Webb had

(Tr. 517-34225).

commented that he believed his reasoning had

argued effectively in support of the various motions,

something he did not believe Zarinegar would have been able to d0.

(Tr. 69: 16-24.) In fact,

subsequent proceedings in the case proved that the District Court was correct. For example, after
the grant 0f partial

Brian

Webb

summary judgment

for the

Department on July

Legal to Withdraw, Zarinegar chose not t0 hire

new

which order

1“,

also allowed

counsel. Instead, from the time

he ﬁred his counsel and through the time of this appeal, Zarinegar ﬁled more than a hundred pages
of illogical writings that did not properly or coherently raise any legal issues. At the hearing on

September

30th,

Zarinegar appeared pro se and the transcript shows that Zarinegar’s arguments

were not nearly as coherent as the arguments

that Brian

Webb provided 0n Zarinegar’s behalf.

In sum, the District Court acted within the rules in applying both
7(b)(3)(F) (“The court

to

Withdraw

IRCP

1

1.3(b)

and I.R.C.P.

may limit oral argument at any time.”) by putting a condition 0n the motion

that required Brian

Webb

Legal t0 argue the motions outstanding and prevented

Zarinegar from also presenting duplicative oral argument, which served the purposes 0f the rules
in ensuring both that Zarinegar could not improperly delay resolution ofthe case

received the best possible oral argument. This

Even

if there

had been an

was not an abuse of discretion.

error, the District

avoid any prejudice t0 Zarinegar. After granting
District

and that Zarinegar

Court took additional actions to make sure t0

summary judgment

for the Department, the

Court did not enter ﬁnal judgment for another three months, allowing Zarinegar more than

adequate time to either obtain

new

counsel 0r raise any issues pro se. The District Court also set
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May 2 1

St

make any arguments he

were not adequately made

at the

hearing. During the September 30th hearing, the District Court allowed Zarinegar t0

make

another hearing to allow Zarinegar to

any arguments he wanted

to

make

to seek reconsideration

felt

of the summary judgment order and t0

argue against entry 0f the ﬁnal judgment requested by the Department. (Tr. 7329-105:
end, Zarinegar had every opportunity to fully represent himself and

wanted

to

make. In

fact, in his

his claimed error at the

error.

effect

make every argument

parties’ rights

See, e.g.,

Lamm

v.

State, 143

is

not provided in order to nitpick minor procedural

nor on the

trial

court’s decision that

IV.

CONCLUSION

is

ﬂaws

that

he

this

Court afﬁrm the

3rd day 0f March, 2020

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/

had n0

under challenge.”).

decisions of the District Court.

this

that

Idaho 763, 766, 152 P.3d

For the foregoing reasons, the Department respectfully requests that

Submitted

In the

(“Lamm has not identiﬁed the slightest prejudice arising from this alleged

Appellate review

on the

1.)

Appellant’s Brief, Zarinegar does not even allege a prejudice from

May 21“ hearing.

634, 637 (Ct. App. 2006)

1

Loren Messerlv

Loren K. Messerly, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Finance
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby certify that 0n this 3rd day of March, 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy 0f the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

g
D
D
D
g

Sean Zarinegar
42132 N. Mountain Cove Dr.
Phoenix, AZ 85086

/s/

U.S. Mail
Facsimile:

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email: sean@cbacapital.com

Loren Messerly

Loren K. Messerly
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